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FEDERAL PANDERING ADVERTISEMENTS STATUTE:
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY VERSUS THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Title III of the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 19671, en-
titled: "Prohibition of pandering advertisements in the mails," offers a pro-
cedure whereby any householder who receives an advertisement which he
alone believes to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative may insulate
himself from further mailings by the same sender. As originally drafted,
the House bill2 left the determination of the nature of the mail matter to
the Postmaster General. The bill was amended3 to leave that determination
solely to the recipient, and it passed the House and Senate in that form.
139 U.S.C.A. § 4009 provides:
(a) Whoever for himself, or by his agents or assigns, mails or causes to be mailed
any pandering advertisement which offers for sale matter which the addressee in his sole
discretion believes to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative shall be subject to an
order of the Postmaster General to refrain from further mailings of such materials to des-
ignated addresses thereof.
(b) Upon receipt of notice from an addressee that he has received such mail matter,
determined by the addressee in his sole discretion to be of the character described in sub-
section (a) of this section, the Postmaster General shall issue an order, if requested by
the addressee, to the sender thereof, directing the sender and his agents or assigns to refrain
from further mailings to the named addressees.(c) The order of the Postmaster General shall expressly prohibit the sender and his
agents or assigns from making any further mailings to the designated addressees, effective
on the thirtieth calendar day after receipt of the order. The order of the Postmaster
General shall also direct the sender and his agents or assigns to delete immediately the
names of the designated addressees from all mailing lists owned or controlled by the sender
or his agents or assigns and, further, shall prohibit the sender and his agents or assigns
from the sale, rental, exchange, or other transaction involving mailing lists bearing the
names of the designated addressees.
(d) Whenever the Postmaster General believes that the sender or anyone acting on
his behalf has violated or is violating the order given under this section, he shall serve
upon the sender, by registered or certified mail, a complaint stating the reasons for his
belief and request that any response thereto be filed in writing with the Postmaster Gen-
eral within fifteen days after the date of such service. If the Postmaster General, after ap-
propriate hearing if requested by the sender, and without a hearing if such a hearing is not
requested, thereafter determines that the order given has been or is being violated, he is
authorized to request the Attorney General to make application, and the Attorney General
is authorized to make application, to a district court of the United States for an order di-
recting compliance with such notice.
(e) Any district court of the United States within the jurisdiction of which any mail
matter shall have been sent or received in violation of the order provided for by this section
shall have jurisdiction, upon application by the Attorney General, to issue an order com-
mending compliance with such notice. Failure to observe such order may be punished by
the court as contempt thereof.
(f) Receipt of mail matter thirty days or more after the effective date of the order
provided for by this section shall create a rebuttable presumption that such mail was sent
after such effective date.
(g) Upon request of any addressee, the order of the Postmaster General shall include
the names of any of his minor children who have not attained their nineteenth birthday,
and who reside with the addressee.
2 113 CONG. REc. 28659 (1967).
8 Id. at 28659-60.
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Enactment of the statute triggered an extensive public response. During
the first eighteen and one-half months, the Post Office Department received
368,868 requests for prohibitory orders.4 The Department automatically
complies with any such request, requiring only that it be accompanied by
the mailed advertisement which the recipient deems offensive.5 As a con-
sequence, the sender must refrain from further mailings to the same ad-
dressee and is put to the expense of purging the addressee's name from all
mailing lists he owns or controls.6 While it appears that most requests are
bona fide, others involve advertisements that could in no sense be considered
"pandering." 7 Members of the direct mail advertising industry chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the statute under the first amendment and
under the fifth amendment due process guarantee. Hearing the case on
direct appeal, Rowan v. United States Post Office Department,8 the Supreme
Court upheld the statute. The Court referred briefly to the constitutional
infirmities of commercial enterprise and obscenity but based its holding
primarily on the individual householder's right of privacy. The line of
cases severely limiting government interference with mailing privileges was
ignored. The Rowan decision appears to have raised the right of privacy
to the status of a constitutional imperative and paved the way for further
federal endorsement of reclusion.
I. THE ROWAN DECISION
Appellants, who are publishers, distributors, owners and operators of
mail order houses, mailing list brokers and owners and operators of mail
service organizations, alleged they had received numerous prohibitory or-
ders pursuant to the provisions of the statute. They initiated a declaratory
judgment action9 in the United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California on the ground that 39 U.S.C. § 4009 is unconstitutional.
Appellants contended that the statute violated their rights of free speech
and due process as guaranteed by the first and fifth amendments of the
Constitution. Construing subsections (b) and (c) as prohibiting "adver-
tisements similar" to those initially mailed to the addressee, a three-judge
court 0 determined that § 4009 was constitutional. On direct appeal,"
the United States Supreme Court affirmed but broadened the interpreta-
tion of the section to allow the addressee complete and unfettered discre-
4 Data from Brief for Respondents at 14, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
5 See discussion at note 45 infra.
6 See note 1 supra at (c).
7 See discussion at note 43 infra.
8 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
9 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964).
10 Convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1964).
"1 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964).
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tion in electing whether or not to receive any further material from the
sender.
In addition to upholding the statutory right of addressees to exercise
their unfettered discretion in determining whether or not they shall re-
ceive further materials from a particular sender, the Supreme Court vali-
dated § 4009's mailing list proscriptions"2 and the Post Office Department's
enforcement procedures.' 3 The appellants contended that the required
purging of their mailing lists is confiscatory. The Court held, however,
that the burden does not amount to a fifth amendment due process violation
"[plarticularly when . . . it is being applied to commercial enterprises.' 14
With respect to the due process aspects of the Post Office Department's
enforcement procedures, 15 the Court held that: "It is sufficient that all avail-
able defenses, such as proof that no mail was sent, may be presented to a
competent tribunal before a contempt finding can be made."'0
In its debate on § 4009, the Senate was concerned that the courts might
not accept the standardless determination of erotically arousing or sexually
provocative by any addressee.17  The Supreme Court disposed of that con-
cern by pointing out that: "Congress provided this sweeping power [of
the householder] . . . to avoid possible constitutional questions that might
arise from vesting the power to make any discretionary evaluation of the
material in a governmental official."' 8
Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, in a separate con-
curring opinion agreed that the discretion accorded the addressee, insofar
as the statute ". . . permits [him.1 . . . to require a mailer to remove his
name from its mailing lists .. ."' is constitutional. Justice Brennan sug-
gested, however, that the use of the statute by parents to prevent their
children,20 even if they are eighteen years old, from receiving political, re-
ligious or other materials which the parents find offensive, "... is not with-
our constitutional difficulties."'" He .... understandis] the Court to leave
1 See note 1 supra at (c).
13 39 C.F.RL pt. 916 (1968).
14 397 U.S. at 740 (quoting from the decision of the district court below).
15 See note 13 supra. 39 U.S.CA. § 4009 (h) provides:
(h) The provisions of subchapter II of chapter 5 (relating to administrative pro-
cedure) and chapter 7 (relating to judicial review) of part I of title 5, United States Code,
shall not apply to any provisions of this section.
1I 397 U.S. at 739.
17 113 CoNG. REC. 34231 (1967) (remarks of Senator Javits).
18 397 U.S. at 737. See also Lamont v. Postmaster General, decaring unconstitutional an
act setting "... administrative officials astride to flow of mall to inspect it, appraise it, write
the addressee about it, and await a response before dispatching the mail." 381 U.S. 301, 306
(1965).
19 397 U.S. at 741.
20 See note 1 supra at (g).
21397 U.S. at 741.
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open [this] question....2 The decision, then, was based on a balancing
of appellants' first amendment rights against every individual's right of
privacy.23
II. PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE
In view of the Court's sweeping statement that: "In operative effect the
power of the householder under the statute is unlimited; he or she may
prohibit the mailing of a dry goods catalog . . .",4 it is instructive to re-
view the legislative history of the bill as a guide to the intent of Congress
respecting the type of mail matter to be controlled. The bill, which with
minor but significant language changes, became § 4009, Chapter 51 of title
39, United States Code, was reintroduced in the 90th Congress by Repre-
sentative Glenn Cunningham of the Second District of Nebraska. In his
remarks to the House, Mr. Cunningham described the material that the
statute was intended to control as "... obscene, sexually provocative adver-
tising-pandering advertising ... 5 Mr. Roman Hruska, Senator from
Nebraska, who introduced the companion measure into the Senate said that:
"Title III would allow the recipient of obscene mail to return it to the
Postmaster General.. ."'I and urged the support of all Senators for the bill
so ".... that dealers in filth and obscenity will know exactly where they
stand with the U.S. Congress."2"
Whatever the intention of Congress may have been, it was generally
understood that to avoid constitutional objections, the intention could not
be precisely verbalized in the statute. Representative Waldie, whose
amendment gave the statute its final form, recognized the potential first
amendment problem inherent in requiring the Postmaster General to de-
termine whether the objectionable material meets Supreme Court obscenity
standards. In support of his amendment, he urged that: "By removing
... the right of the Government to involve itself in any determination of
the content and nature of these objectionable materials ... the first amend-
ment [is precluded] from having any application whatsoever."' 8  The
Court agreed, recognizing that: 'Congress provided this sweeping power
... to avoid possible constitutional questions that might arise from vesting
the power to make any discretionary evaluation of the material in a govern-
mental official."'29
22 Id.
23 Id. at 736: "But the right of every person 'to be let alone' must be placed in the scales
with the right of others to communicate."
24 Id. at 737.
25 113 CONG. REc. 28660 (1967).
26 Id. at 34232.
27 Id.
2S Id. at 28660.
29 397 U.S. at 737.
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Nevertheless, § 4009, as passed, presents several problems of interpre-
tation. One difficulty, which was dealt with by the Court, stems from the
incompatible wording of subsections (a) and (b). Subsection (a) says
that a mailer of the matter described "... . shall be subject to the order of
the Postmaster General to refrain from further mailings of such materials
to designated addressees thereof." Subsection (b) and subsequent sec-
tions, 10 however, say that the order of the Postmaster General directs "....
the sender and his agents or assigns to refrain from further mailings to the
named addressees." The Court characterizes these subsections as being
amenable to three plausible constructions: "The order could prohibit all
future mailings to the addressees, all future mailings of advertising material
to the addressees, or all future mailings of similar materials." '  The leg-
islative history,32 the Court asserts, ". .. supports an interpretation that
prohibits all future mailings independent of any objective test."33  Limit-
ing the prohibitory order to similar materials is open to the criticisms
that ". . it would expose the householder to further burdens of scrutiniz-
ing the mail for objectionable material ...[and] it would interpose the
Postmaster General between the sender and the addressee [to] ... create
the appearance if not the substance of governmental censorship." 34
At another point, both the Court's opinion and the legislative history
differ from the wording of the statute. Subsection (a) says: "Whoever
... mails or causes to be mailed any pandering advertisement which offers
for sale matter which the addressee in his sole discretion believes to be
erotically arousing or sexually provocative. . . ." Gramatically, at least,
the requirement of this section is that the addressee's judgment be directed
to the matter offered for sale rather than just to the advertisement. On
the other hand, the legislative history dearly indicates the intention that
the recipient's judgment should extend only to the character of the adver-
tisement itself.35 The Court, while quoting the statute in its opinion,
sides with the legislative history, and refers to ". . . unsolicited advertise-
ments that recipients found to be offensive because of their lewd and
salacious character."3 6 In this instance, the literal wording of the statute
80 See note 1 supra at (b), (c), (e) and (f).
31397 U.s. at 732.
32 "The Postmaster General is then required to issue an order to the sender directing him to
refrain from sending any further mailings of any kind to such person." S. Rep. No. 801, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1967). See also 113 CONG° RE c. 28660 (1967) (remarks of Representative
Waldie) and 34231 (1967) (remarks of Senator Monroney).
33 397 U.S. at 734.
34 Id. at 735.
3t'Title III would allow the recipient of obscene mail to return it to the Postmaster Gen-
eral...." 113 CONG. REc. 34232 (1967) (remarks of Senator Hurska). "... [I]f you or your
minor child receives some of this obscene, sexually provocative advertising. 113 CONG.
REc. 28660 (1967) (remarks of Representative Cunningham).
30 397 U.S. at 731.
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must yield since the only subject for judgment at hand is the mailing
which is required by the statute to be an advertisement.
Finally, it is interesting to note that Timothy May, then General Counsel
for the United States Post Office, expressed the opinion before a Senate
Committee hearing on the bill that "... an addressee... would be em-
powered to determine that all 'occupant' mail, soap advertisements, bills
from creditors, income tax forms, even a letter from [his) Congressman,
were pandering advertisements, and could prohibit any further mailings
from such mailers on pain of contempt of court."' 1  Both the Court and
the Post Office Department, however, have since disavowed such a broad
interpretation. Both require that an objective finding be made, first by the
Post Office Department and later, if necessary, at a hearing, that "... the
initial material mailed to the addressee was an advertisement .... ,as
III. EFFECT OF THE STATUTE
Representative Cunningham asserted as a justification for the statute
that ". . . during [the year prior to its enactment) . .. one-quarter million
complaints have come into the Post Office Department with reference to
this type of pandering advertisement.... .'" Between the effective date
of the statute, April 14, 1958, and November 1, 1969, a period of eighteen
and one-half months, the Post Office Department received 368,868 re-
quests for prohibitory orders. During the same period, 291,340 prohibitory
orders were issued. As of December 31, 1969, 2,121 complaints under the
statute were pending in the district courts and thirteen complaints had
been acted upon. Most of the thirteen complaints were resolved by default
in favor of government.40 One of appellants asserted that he had received
250 prohibitory orders and more than 3,000 requests from mailing list
renters to remove names. He estimated his name-removal costs at $7,000.41
While counsel for respondents contended that: "No action has yet been
filed against an advertiser whose material could not reasonably be thought
to be pandering within the statutory contemplation... ,,,42 amicus curiae in
support of appellant suggested that the same may not always be true.
Amicus called the Court's attention to the fact that prohibitory orders have
been served upon direct mail advertisers for "... . such things as The Family
Heritage Bible, La Salle Extension University, Business Week Magazine,
Illustrated Electronics Course, The Christian Herald's Family Bookshelf,
The American Scholar Magazine, The Center for the Study of Democratic
87 Hearings on H.R. 7977 Before the Senate Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., 545 (1967).
88 397 U.S. at 739.
39 113 CoNG. REc 28660 (1967).
4 0 Data from Brief for Respondents at 14,397 U.S. 728 (1970).
41 Id. at 48.
42 d. at 14.
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Institutions, Roget's International Thesaurus, hospital insurance plans, gro-
cery store weekend specials, tool kits, etc..... indicat[ing] that § 4009 has
been indiscriminately employed against all types of advertising. ' '43
IV. ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATUTE BY THE
POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT
At the time the statute became effective, the Post Office Department is-
sued two documents dealing with its administration. The first, POD Pub-
lication 125,44 was directed to Postal Services Center Employees and was
intended to define the functions required of them by the statute. Under
II. THE PATRON'S RESPONSIBILITY, Publication 125 points out that
the recipient has the sole responsibility for deciding that a mail piece is a
pandering advertisement offering to sell erotically arousing or sexually pro-
vocative matter. To trigger § 4009 proceedings, a patron must notify the
Post Office Department of his determination and identify himself, the
sender of the material and the name of any unmarried, pre-nineteen age
children at his residence who are to be protected against future mailings.
This information may be submitted on Post Office Department Form 2150
or, if that is not available, on plain paper. It is sent, together with the
objectionable mailing including wrapper and enclosures, to the local post-
master or postal services center. In 111. PROCESSING THE PATRON'S
REQUEST, the Post Office Department emphasizes that "... . the only
question to be determined by the services center with respect to the offend-
ing mail piece is whether it constitutes an advertisement." 45  An adver-
tisement is defined as "... . material-including, but not limited to, display,
classified or editorial styles-which offers for sale any matter which the
addressee thereof believes, in his sole discretion, to be erotically arousing or
sexually provocative." 46 If the patron does not furnish the necessary in-
formation, or does not enclose all of the offending mail piece, his request is
returned with the suggestion that it be corrected. When possessed of the
necessary information, the services center postmaster issues a prohibitory
order directing ". . . the mailer of the pandering advertisement, effective
thirty calendar days after the mailer's receipt of the Order, to make no
further mailings of any kind to the persons protected by the Order. '47 As
POD Publication 125 points out, such a prohibition "... . extends to any
and every type mailing, not just future pandering advertisements. '48  The
Order also directs the mailer ". . . to delete the names of the persons pro-
43 Brief for Direct Mail Advertising Assoc. Inc., Anicus Curiae at 4, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
4 4 ADMINISTBERNG THE PANDERING ADVERTISEMENTS STATUTE (POD Publication 125
April 1968).
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tected by the Order from all mailing lists owned or controlled by the mailer
or his agents or assigns [andl . . . to immediately refrain from the sale,
rental, exchange, or other transaction involving mailing lists bearing the
names of the protected persons."49  Further sections of the Publication
deal with post office actions following violation of a prohibitory order.
A much briefer pamphlet entitled, HOW YOU CAN CURB PAN-
DERING ADVERTISEMENTS50 was published for general distribution.
This pamphlet also emphasizes that the determination of whether material
is erotically arousing or sexually provocative is up to the recipient but
makes it clear that the statute relates specifically to advertising.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
STATUTE AND DECISION
The Court considers appellants' arguments that: " 'The freedom to
communicate orally and by written word and, indeed, in every manner
whatsoever is imperative to a free and sane society.' "' and replies that "....
the right of every person 'to be let alone' must be placed in the scales with
the right of others to communicate."52 Thus, the statute is constitutional
if the individual recipient's right to privacy outweighs the mailer's first
amendment speech rights. The Court concludes that: "If [the statute]
operates to impede the flow of even valid ideas, the answer is that no one
has a right to press even 'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient."5 3
With Rowan, the right of privacy, which was little recognized in this
country before the 1890 Warren-Brandeis article,54 reached a new high wat-
ermark as a constitutional imperative. Though Judge Cooley in 1878, had
referred to privacy as the right "to be let alone, '55 other contemporary
commentators considered the concept to be no more than a property or im-
plied contract right.5 6 Consequently, early privacy law operated only to
prevent the exposure of one's private life to public scrutiny. Soon after
the Warren-Brandeis article, however, the state courts began to develop
the concept that privacy might include the right to insulate oneself from
unsolicited annoyances or expressions by others.5  This aspect of privacy
appears in Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent to Olmstead v. United States"8
49 Id.
50 POD Publication 123 (Rev.) (June 1969).
5" 397 U.S. at 735 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 15).
521d. at 736.
531d. at 738.
5 4 Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L REV. 193 (1890).
55 1 T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 29 (1879).
56 See Comment, Advertising and The Right of Privacy, 9 VILL. L. REv. 274, 275 (1963-64)
and Patterson, Privacy: A Summary of Past and Present, 35 PENN. B.A.Q. 52, 54 (1963-64).
57 See Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190, 197-98, 50 S.E. 68, 71
(1904).
58 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
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wherein he said: "The makers of our Constitution... conferred, as against
the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Then, starting in
1943, a series of Supreme Court decisions balancing the right of privacy in
the home against the free speech rights of solicitors, confirmed the house-
holder's right to decide whether he would receive door-to-door solicitors, 9
dismissed an appeal from a state court decision upholding a trespass statute
prohibiting unwanted solicitations,60 upheld an ordinance forbidding loud
and raucous noises on public streets6' and upheld Green River Ordinances
which forbid solicitations at private residences without consent. 2 In 1965
privacy acquired the status of a constitutional right.63 Speaking for the
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, Mr. Justice Douglas said "... . that specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by eminations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance .... Various
guarantees create zones of privacy." 64
One of the few asserted limitations on the right of individual privacy
is found in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak which holds that: "How-
ever complete his right of privacy may be at home, it is substantially limited
by the rights of others when its possessor travels on a public thoroughfare
or rides in a public conveyance."65  That case dealt with petitioner's ob-
jection to radio programs on government operated streetcars and busses.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented reminding the Court that the streetcar
audience is a captive one that should not be subject to invasion of its pri-
vacy ". . . over and beyond the risks of travel." 66 In an obscenity case, the
Court commented that ".. . we do not think [obscenity statutes3 reach into
the privacy of one's own home."6 It added, in the 1968 constitutionality
test of a New York statute prohibiting the sale of defined material to minors,
that: "When expression occurs in a setting where the capacity to make a
choice is absent, government regulation of that expression may co-exist
with and even implement First Amendment guarantees. '68 Judicially, then,
the stage was set for the Rowan decision permitting the government to as-
sist the homeowner to control the flow of unwanted advertisements to his
mailbox.
At about the time the Court was beginning to strengthen the home-
59 Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
60 Hall v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 72, 49 S.E.2d 369, appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 875
(1948).
61 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
62 Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
03 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
64 Id. at 484.
65 343 U.S. 451, 464 (1952).
G6 Id. at 468.
67 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
68 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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owner's right to privacy, it was assigning a preferred Bill of Rights status
to first amendment freedoms, 69 though that concept was later moderated 0
and criticized in concurring7 and dissenting opinions.72 Speech protected
by the first amendment has been said to include all utterances except the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, insulting or fighting words,73
fraud74 and speech constituting a dear and present danger that it would
bring about substantive evils within the power of the government to pre-
vent.75  In Jamison v. Texas,76 the concept that commercial speech may
have less weight on the constitutional scale than non-commercial speech
was introduced. But in 1966, the Court asserted that ". . . commercial ac-
tivity, in itself, is no justification for narrowing the protection of expres-
sion secured by the First Amendment." 77
In a long series of decisions dealing with the first amendment rights of
post office patrons, the courts have gone from a 1904 holding that "...
[al legislative body in... establishing a postal service may annex such con-
ditions . .. as it chooses"78 to an almost complete proscription on mailing
limitations in 1969. First amendment protections were guaranteed to sealed
letters in 1878.'9 In 1946, the Supreme Court reversed an order denying
second-class mailing privileges to a magazine because it was in poor taste
and vulgar and did not contribute to the public good and welfare.A0 Six-
teen years later three concurring justices concluded that a statute banning
from the mails materials not patently offensive would encounter constitu-
tional obstacles.8' The judicial retreat from congressional hegemony over
the post office was completed in 1969 when the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the use of the mails is no longer a privilege to which
Congress may freely attach such conditions as it desires,,' There seemed
to be no dispute, at least until Rowan, that: "The right of freedom of
speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the
right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read. . . Without
those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less secure.188
69 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945).
7 0 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949).
71 Id. at 90 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
72 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
73 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
74 Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 389 (1960).
7 5 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
76 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943).
77 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966).
7 8 Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497,506 (1904).
7 9 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878).
80 Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146, 149-50 (1946).
8 1 Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 495-519 (1962) (Brennan, J., concurring).
8 2 Hiett v. United States, 415 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1969) cert. denied 397 U.S. 936 (1970).
s8 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965).
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In several past clashes between first amendment and other rights, the
Supreme Court has taken note of the availability of means of communica-
tion other than the one at issue. In Breard v. Alexandria, for instance, in
banning unwanted door-to-door solicitations, the Court noted that: "The
usual methods of solicitation-radio, periodicals, mail, local agencies-are
open." In a subsequent labor relations case, Justice Harlan in dissent
commented that a picketing prohibition was ". . . not inconsistent with the
protections of the First Amendment, particularly when.., other methods of
communication are left open."' '85 Such alternatives not being available to
the appellants in Rowan, a determinative dash between the advertising
mailer's first amendment rights to postal services and recipient's right of pri-
vacy was unavoidable.
Now, the question arises whether the Rowan decision is the logical con-
sequence of past decisions or a break with judicial precedents. The privacy
decisions dearly support Rowan. The Post Office Department first amend-
ment decisions do not. The status of the latter prior to Rowan is summed
up by the Hiett holding that:
When a postal law affects expression, the exercise of the postal power
must be tested against the first amendment.... [Al statute affecting ex-
pression, even if enacted under the postal power, is constitutional only
if either (1) it meets the twin tests of specificity and narrowness or (2)
the expression it affects is not protected speech.86
Unless that decision is to be reversed and earlier Supreme Court decisions
implicitly overruled, precedent would seem to require that mailed advertise-
ments subject to prohibitory orders be characterized as unprotected speech.
If so, such advertisements must be a type of speech already denied protec-
tion by the Court.8 7
The statute speaks of pandering advertising and material believed to be
erotically arousing or sexually provocative, but it clearly may affect material
that is not lewd or obscene. "In operative effect the power of the house-
holder under the statute is unlimited; he or she may prohibit the mailing of
a dry goods catalog because he objects to the contents--or indeed the text
of the language touting the merchandise." 88  Objectively, then, nothing
more is required of the mailer to trigger the statute than that he mail an
advertisement to an unwilling recipient. But is an advertisement unpro-
tected speech? As noted above, Jamison v. Texas" suggested that commer-
cial speech has less first amendment weight than non-commercial speech.
A year earlier, Valentine v. Chrestensen9" held that handbill distribution
84 341 U.S. 622, 631-32 (1951).
65 NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 93 (1964).
8 Hiett v. United States, supra note 82, at 669.
8 7 See discussion at notes 73-5 supra.
-8 397 U.S. at 737.
89 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943).
00 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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may be kept off the streets to the extent it interferes with their use by peo-
ple, but suggested that if the handbills were not advertisements they might
be protected. Since then, however, the Court has uniformly rejected the
concept that commercial speech suffers from any first amendment infirmity.
"Those who make their living through exercise of First Amendment rights
are no less entitled to its protection than those whose advocacy or promotion
is not hitched to a profit motive." 91  "Valentine ...has not survived
reflection." 92 "... . [C]ommercial activity, in itself, is no justification for
narrowing the protection of expression secured by the First Amendment."93
The Rowan Court also discouraged any appeal to the second-class commer-
cial speech theory by stating that: "If this [statutel operates to impede the
flow of even valid ideas, the answer is that no one has a right to press even
'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient." 4  "Nothing in the Constitution
compels us to listen to or view any unwanted communication, whatever its
Merit. ...,,5
In its Ginzburg v. United States decision, 6 affirming a federal obscen-
ity statut9 7 conviction, the Court gave conclusive weight to the fact that
petitioner characterized the material to be mailed as obscene in his adver-
tisements. In that sense, the Rowan decision may be an extension of Ginz-
burg. Prior to Ginzburg, an affirmative finding that the mailed material
was obscene had to be made by federal authorities applying the Roth test."'
In the Ginzburg decision, the Court suggested that if the mailer himself
characterizes the mail piece as obscene, in close cases federal authorities
may take him at his word and find a violation. Rowan can be viewed as
merely removing the determination one step further from the government
by making the recipient the judge. While the Rowan Court makes no allu-
sion to the Ginzburg case, explaining the lack of first amendment protection
for mail covered by § 4009 seems easier precedentially on a nonprotected,
subjectively determined obscenity theory than on a commercial speech
theory.
Another possibility is that § 4009 mail is not unprotected speech. The
Court's references to advertisements and to obscenity are brief compared
with its expansive treatment of privacy. They may be no more than a
necessary concession to the legislative history and statutory language. The
91 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959).
921d. at 513-14.
93 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966). See also Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147, 150 (1959); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,266 (1964).
9- 397 U.S. at 738.
951d. at 737.
96 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
97 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964).
98 [W hether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
[Vol. 3f2
NOTES
real thrust of the Court's decision may be that privacy is now a pervasive
right that can be curtailed only by a specific limitation in the Constitu-
tion - perhaps an individual right that is analogous to the now partially
discredited" right of the State to protect itself and the public order from
endangering speech. Speaking of the "State" right in 1927, the Court said
that: "... . the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak ...
and that a State... may punish those [making} . . . utterances inimical to
the public welfare . . . is not open to question."'10  The Rowan Court's
treatment of the individual's privacy right is startlingly parallel: "Nothing
in the Constitution compels us to listen to or view any unwanted communi-
cation ....... [T]he power of the householder.., is unlimited; he...
may prohibit the mailing because he objects to the contents. ... "101 If this
analysis is correct, the householder's right to bar other types of subjectively
undesirable communication from his premises merely awaits appropriate
legislation. Timothy May, then General Counsel for the United States
Post Office, forecast a result nearly that extensive under § 4009 and pre-
dicted it would "... .plunge the postal system into chaos, and most certainly
destroy the mail advertising industry."'102
Regardless of the constitutional basis for Rowan, the construed statute
clearly does not make direct mail advertising illegal per se, but it may affect
the industry's economic vitality. By virtue of the "operative effect" lan-
guage of the Court, 03 no mailer can predict what type of advertisement will
incur a prohibitory order. For the broad spectrum of mailers, including
the majority that do not send pandering advertisements but merely offer
goods that serve the normal daily commerce of the nation, a bad guess in-
curs the economic penalties associated with the purging of their mailing
lists.10 4 The material offered for sale may be a Bible, an American flag, a
subscription to Playboy. It makes no difference. If the recipient can dem-
onstrate that the mailing is an advertisement, he can procure the issuance
of a prohibitory order, and compliance with that order will increase the
mailer's costs. Since his costs help determine his effectiveness in the market
place, increased costs may mean decreased viability. Under the statute,
this consequence flows not from his motives or the goods of his commerce,
but from the fact that he mails his advertisements. The legislative history
does not reveal that Congress intended that result.
Application of the statute may produce additional anamolous effects.
The legislative history indicates that Congress accepted the possibility
that some mail recipients would use § 4009 to avoid mail . . . [which]
99 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969).
100 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927).
101 397 U.S. at 737.
1o Hearings, supra note 37.
103 397 U.S. at 737.
1 04 See note 12 supra.
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they did not genuinely believe to... [be] pandering.... [I]ts extension
to [such] areas . . .is supported chiefly by considerations of workability
and convenience. 105
If Congress also recognized that recipients could use the statute to exert
economic pressure on a mailer, such as union pressure against an employer,
it did not say so. Respondent, in its brief, recognized this possibility and
suggested that if a limitation on the statute will answer the complaints of
mailers, the courts could "... . look behind the addressee's formal complaint
to discover whether he in fact made in good faith the determination the
statute calls for."'106 Respondent also suggests that mailers ". . . may well
have a private tort remedy for any damages caused by the sting of a false
accusation of pandering recklessly or maliciously made."'10 7
If Congress' statutory intent was to bar only unwanted obscenity from
the mails, it failed in another respect. The Court makes it clear that a
mailed advertisement which is not objectionable by any objective test can
still trigger a prohibitory order banning future mailings regardless of their
value. Ignoring for the moment other obscenity statutes, any mailer, how-
ever, can mail offensive material of a non-advertising nature without limita-
tion. As the statute is worded, a mailer may even send advertisements that
only offer offensive material for lease, rental or exchange. While the
language of Rowan suggests that such advertisements would not escape the
proscriptions of the statute, the Postal Services Centers Guide limits offend-
ing mail pieces to material ". . . which offers for sale any matter which the
addressee ...believes ...to be erotically arousing or sexually provoca-
tive." 08
The Supreme Court's emphasis on the right of privacy in the home al-
most assures that similar statutes covering unwanted telephone and tele-
graph advertisements would be constitutional. Since: "Nothing in the Con-
stitution compels us to ... view any unwanted communication.. .",109 a
statute requiring senders to identify their mailings so that the post office
could suspend delivery of certain types at the addressee's request may
also be constitutional. From there it is a short step to a requirement that
radio and TV advertisers segregate and assign their advertisements to one
clearly identified period in each program which the audience could avoid
if it wished. Applying the Court's dictum,110 it is difficult to show that any
constitutional right of the advertiser would be violated by such a require-
ment.
There remains the question as to where, if at all, the individual's right
105 Brief for Respondents at 37-38, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
106 Id. at 39-40.
107 Id. at 39.
108 POD Publication 125 supra note 44, at5.
109 397 U.S. at 737.
110 397 U.S. at 740 (quoting from the opinion of the district court below).
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of privacy must yield to the citizen's need to know in order to participate
in a democracy. The Supreme Court recently said that: "Exposure of the
self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized com-
munity. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society
which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press.""'
"[The] right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social
worth .. . is fundamental to our free society."- 2 The other aspect of the
problem is expressed by Harper and James in their tort text: ". .. [S]o-
ciety cannot protect the neurotically thin-skinned against those trivial inva-
sions of privacy which the normal person suffers with equanimity." 113 An
alternative, of course, to the barring of mail at the source is the recipient's
"... short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can .... ", 4
Walker B. Lowman
Ill Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
222 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
13 1 HAR, R AND JAMEs, THE LAw oF TORTS 691 (1956).
114 1amont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883 (S.D.N.Y.) af'd
Per curiam, 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967).
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